Made by passionate people, for people

albadr.aiBlog
← All posts

BADR14 min read

The tab nobody opened

A Word, Excel, PowerPoint or PDF file holds more than the page it shows. BADR is our MVP demo for the minute before a file is sent, and this is how it is put together, what we measured, and what it cannot do yet.

On 3 February 2025 a manager at the Canada Border Services Agency sent a shift-scheduling spreadsheet to 70 employees. The file also contained a secondary tab with personal information on more than 18,000 other employees. A workbook went out by email, and it was larger than the sheet its sender was looking at. The agency later found four other similar spreadsheet incidents in 2024 and 2025.

It had happened before. On 8 August 2023 the Police Service of Northern Ireland answered a freedom-of-information request with a spreadsheet. The visible tabs had been deleted, but one stayed out of view, marked only by three dots on the tab bar, and the quality check looked at the response tab alone. The hidden tab listed all 9,483 officers and staff, with surname, rank and location, and it stayed on a public website for almost two and a half hours. The service later failed to have its £750,000 fine reduced.

In February 2014 Australia’s immigration department published a statistics report as a Word file with the source Excel spreadsheet embedded in it: personal information on about 9,250 asylum seekers, on the department’s website for about eight and a half days. Department policy called for seven reviewers to clear such a report, in hard copy. The digital file was not checked for embedded data.

We built BADR for the minute before such a file leaves. It is an MVP demo in its presentation stage, not a product yet. It reads a Word, Excel, PowerPoint or PDF file the way a recipient’s software could, lists what the file gives away with the real values found, and returns a clean copy. At albadr.ai the scan and the clean copy are free, one file at a time, up to 10 MB. Masking identifiers inside the document, the optional AI explanation and the API need a key. It reads text only: images and scanned pages are not read.

Office software hides rather than deletes

The people in these stories used their software as it was designed. Hiding a sheet, deleting the sheet a pivot table was built on, pasting a chart into a slide: none of these takes the content out of the file. Our own reports say it in the formats’ terms. On a workbook with a pivot table the report says: “A copy of the pivot table’s source data stays in the file, even if the source sheet was deleted.” A PDF that was saved several times gets this line: “Each incremental save appends to the file without erasing: earlier versions of text, fields or annotations remain readable.” And a slide deck with a chart in it: “The whole Excel workbook behind the chart travels with the deck, other sheets included.”

None of this is news to the people who write guidance. The NSA’s guide Redacting with Confidence, first issued in December 2005, says “The most common mistake is covering text with black” and, of anything that must not be read, “The item must be deleted.” A fact sheet from Canada’s federal privacy commissioner, dated 2006 and now archived, lists tracked changes, comments, the names of current and previous authors, revisions, versions and hidden text among what travels inside a shared document. Microsoft’s own support page says its Document Inspector cannot detect text hidden as white on a white background, and that in Excel it reports but cannot remove embedded files, macros and cached PivotTable data. The page describes a manual check of the one file that is open.

Knowing has not been enough. Researchers at Inria examined 39,664 PDF files published by 75 security agencies in 47 countries, and 33% of them revealed the identity of the person who created the file. Of all those files, 24% had been cleaned before publication, and for 65% of the cleaned ones the cleaning was weak: hidden information could still be recovered. Of the 82 PDFs the study took from the NSA’s own website, 45 still carried their full metadata.

Quebec’s Commission d’accès à l’information received 444 incident notices in 2023-2024, and accidental communication was among the causes in 58 of them. Under the province’s private-sector privacy act, as amended by Law 25, a court can fine an enterprise up to $25 million or 4% of its worldwide turnover, whichever is greater.

Files now go to AI assistants as well. In one security vendor’s monitoring data, drawn from its own customers and so not a random sample, 26.38% of the files uploaded to generative-AI tools between July and September 2025 contained sensitive information, up from 22% the quarter before. Some cases are on the public record. In New South Wales a former temporary staff member uploaded an Excel spreadsheet of 10 columns and more than 12,000 rows to ChatGPT in March 2025, exposing personal information of 2,031 people in a flood-recovery housing program.

What BADR does

You drop one file on the page. A report comes back: one verdict line with a risk level, then what the file gives away, grouped by kind and sorted by risk. Each clean-up option is a switch, and one click returns the clean copy. On the site’s own sample, a fictional offer in Word, the verdict begins “This file gives away 27 items, 10 of them high risk”.

It looks in places nobody opens by hand: the saved name of a network printer, a header that prints the file path, a data connection that carries its server, its account and sometimes its password, the workbook behind a chart, the earlier versions an edited PDF still holds, an identifier that appears nowhere on the page because only a formula or a link’s address holds it. It recognizes 11 kinds of identifier, among them social insurance numbers, Quebec health insurance numbers, payment cards and IBANs.

How it is put together

These are its properties, each with its cost. The page is interface only. The engine runs on our server and never reaches a browser, which receives about 100 KB of script (36 KB compressed), and that script calls its own origin and nothing else: no tracking, no advertising, no analytics. The cost is that a document has to travel to us, over an encrypted connection.

So a file is read in memory and never kept. The server keeps nothing of a document between two requests, and when you ask for the clean copy the page sends the document again. The logs hold counts and sizes (the kind of file, its size, how many findings, how long it took) and no file name, content or address. The file is handled in the data centre that receives it, generally the nearest, which may be outside Quebec or Canada. The cost is every feature that would need a memory of your documents. What it buys is that there is no store of documents to protect or to hand over.

The engine is self-contained. While it reads or cleans it calls nothing outside itself, no AI service included, and it never executes anything a file contains, whether macro, script, field or formula. The same file always gives the same report, apart from the line that says how long the scan took. The cost is that detection works by patterns, which can miss something or flag too much, so every finding is shown with its location for a person to judge. When a part of an Office file cannot be read, the report says so, the verdict is never “all clear”, and no clean copy is made.

All of it runs under a 128 MB memory cap, the allowance of a small sandbox on an edge platform. The hosted demo’s limits are sized for that sandbox: 10 MB per document, 20 documents and 25 MB per request. Each request also has a ceiling on the work it takes on. A document that does not fit is listed in the answer with the reason, and the client sends it again in a smaller batch.

The clean copy holds what you chose to keep. Deleted text, earlier versions and content left behind by past edits are not in it. Masking removes the characters, where a black box would only sit on top of them, and a masked copy is read once more so that the report can count anything that could not be masked. Hidden sheets, rows and columns are made visible rather than deleted, so that you see what the recipient could have found.

What we measured

The first table times the scan alone, the engine reading a file and writing its report, on one desktop processor from 2012 (an Intel Core i7-3770). Each value is the median of 3 runs after a warm-up, except that a file whose scan and clean copy together take more than 20 s is timed once. The files are synthetic, built at real sizes from text that varies like prose. “With photos” means 10% text, and random bytes standing in for the pictures.

Scan, engine only0.25 MB1 MB5 MB10 MB
Word, text only107 ms573 ms3.5 snot measured
Excel109 ms610 ms4.5 snot measured
PDF, text only106 ms318 ms405 ms540 ms
Word with photos12 ms44 ms214 ms435 ms
PowerPoint with photos12 ms36 ms187 ms410 ms
PDF with photos3 ms7 ms31 ms60 ms

Up to 1 MB, every kind of file is read in at most 0.61 s. At 25 MB, a Word or PowerPoint file that is mostly photos takes 1.3 s, and a PDF 148 ms. Three cautions go with the table. Text compresses well, so the text-only Office files are denser than their size suggests: unpacked, the 1 MB Word file holds about 7.8 MB of text and markup and the 1 MB Excel file about 5.5 MB, and the hosted demo refuses an Office document with more than 5 MB of it. From 1 MB up, those two rows are the engine’s speed and not something the demo will do for you. Nor are the 25 MB figures, since the demo stops at 10 MB. And the text-only PDF row flattens after 1 MB because in a long PDF the scan reads the text of at most the first 400 pages, and says so in its report.

The clean copy costs more than the scan. With every option on and identifiers blacked out, a text-heavy file took 2.4 to 4.1 s at 1 MB, and a 5 MB spreadsheet took 81 s. These too are the engine’s figures, for files denser than the demo accepts. A 1 MB file that is mostly photos took 0.03 to 0.21 s.

The second table is the worst case through the API: every option, identifier masking, a ZIP coming back. Each scenario ran once with the size limits lifted, then again under a 128 MB memory cap set on a server process to stand in for the edge sandbox.

Worst case, one run eachTimeUnder the 128 MB cap
One Word, PowerPoint or PDF document, 1 MB0.05 to 0.14 sfits
One PDF, 15 MB0.8 sfits, close to the cap
20 mixed documents of 1 MB5.2 s6.0 s
40 mixed documents of 1 MB10.3 s11.8 s

These figures leave things out. They time the engine, and what you wait for adds the upload and the answer’s way back. Nothing was measured on the edge platform’s own processors, and every file was synthetic. And nothing here measures accuracy: we have no precision or recall figure to publish yet. The web edition carries 189 automated tests, which show that the engine does what we specified and cannot show that what we specified catches everything.

Why we call it an AI solution

Two kinds of AI are in BADR, and we keep them apart.

The engine is the older kind, knowledge written down as rules, and it is built with the methods of data science. Each of its steps has an ordinary name: entity recognition for finding a social insurance number in running text, validation for confirming it by its check digit, structural analysis for reading a file’s structure and not only its text, rule-based classification for ranking what was found. None of this is our invention. NIST’s report on de-identification, surveying work on medical records, names rule-based systems as one of the two primary techniques explored for finding identifiers in free text. Nothing in the engine is machine-learned or statistical, and that is deliberate: every finding traces back to a rule a person wrote, and nothing is learned from your file. It is why the FAQ on our site can say that no AI reads your documents. In the sense most people mean in 2026, a language model reading the file, none does.

Whether the older kind still counts as AI depends on who is asked. Stanford’s One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence calls it the “AI effect”: AI brings a technology into common use, people get used to it, and it stops being considered AI. Official texts draw the line in different places. Recital 12 of the EU AI Act counts logic- and knowledge-based approaches among AI techniques and, in the same recital, says the definition “should not cover systems that are based on the rules defined solely by natural persons to automatically execute operations”. Canada’s federal directive on automated decisions, which governs administrative decisions in the federal government, steps around the question: its definition of an automated decision system covers any technology that assists or replaces the judgment of a human decision maker, and names rules-based systems alongside machine learning and neural networks. We make no claim about how a regulator would class our engine.

The second kind is the one most people now mean by the word: a language model. It is optional. For key holders, one click makes one call that explains the findings in a few plain sentences. It writes words only, and the risk level stays the engine’s. It receives the findings and never the file, after they have been de-identified by ordinary data-science means: data minimization, pseudonymization (stand-ins for detected identifiers and for the names of the file’s authors and editors, with the real values put back only in your browser), generalization and truncation. We do not call that anonymization, because an excerpt “can still hold another person’s name, an amount or a sentence from the document”. On our hosted demo that call goes to an outside AI service provider. In a deployment of the customer’s own, the model can be one of the customer’s choosing, including one that runs on its own machines. Without it the standard report is complete.

Where it fits and how a client connects it

The step is the same wherever a document crosses a boundary: a law firm sending a contract whose tracked changes still hold the text it deleted, a public body answering an access-to-information request with a spreadsheet, someone about to upload a report to an AI assistant, a pipeline that publishes or archives documents that nobody reads one by one.

Integration is one HTTPS call with a multipart upload, from any language or from a workflow tool’s HTTP step. A call carries up to 20 documents. One document comes back as the cleaned file. Several come back as a ZIP with a manifest that says, for each, which options were applied and what was removed, for the client’s own logs. A document that fails is listed in the manifest while the others still come back, and a refusal over a limit states what was measured, the limit and why the limit exists.

We ship no connectors. The call could sit where your documents already pass: the outbound step of a mail gateway, the publish step of a document management system, a script that watches a shared folder, the step before an upload to an AI assistant. We host the API today. Running it in a client’s own cloud account or on its own servers is available on request, and is not packaged yet.

Moving it to another host

The limits are settings, not code: on a larger host the number of documents, their size and the ceiling on work are raised by configuration. The engine already runs on two kinds of host, the edge sandbox in production and an ordinary server process in development and in every test above.

The whole engine also exists a second time, written for a second runtime as a native Windows application that works with no server at all: no file leaves the computer. It is not released. With the first engine there to check against, the second took a single day, 7 November 2026. A corpus of 48 documents went through both in five modes: every scan identical, every clean copy equivalent. The one difference found was a few bytes in a finding that prints the size of an embedded archive. The application’s installer is 2.1 MB.

What the demo does not do yet

BADR is a demo, and these are its limits today. It reads text only: text inside a picture or a scanned page is neither checked nor masked. In a long PDF the text of at most the first 400 pages is read, and the report says so. Word, Excel and PowerPoint 97-2003 files are not supported. The identifiers are tuned for Canada and Quebec. Detection works by patterns, so a valid-looking number that is not an identifier can be flagged and a malformed one can be missed. A file can be 10 MB at most, and an Office document can hold at most 5 MB of text and markup once unpacked. An encrypted PDF is analyzed for its structure only and gets no clean copy. It has had no outside security audit, and it carries no service-level commitment. Check every clean copy before you send it; in an unattended step, that check is a person or a rule reading the manifest.

The scan is free at albadr.ai. No price is posted. For a key, or to talk about running BADR inside your own systems or acquiring it as it stands, write to contact@albadr.ai.